raised by the proposals, let alone the deep ethical concerns involved, were satisfactorily dealt with. I found myself wondering whether there are some questions which are simply too technical, or maybe even too important, for resolution in this particular arena. To be fair, the specific question is whether the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) should be empowered to grant licences for the creation of such admixed embryos, but the past performance of the Authority does not induce great confidence in its ability to deal with such tricky questions satisfactorily.
Edward Leigh MP opened the debate 3 by proposing an amendment supported by MPs who considered the creation of animal-human embryos to be ethically wrong and not backed by sufficient evidence of its usefulness or necessity. He made it clear that he supported research on stem cells, but argued that many enormous advances are already being made by using post-embryonic stem cells.
Very few MPs are scientists, and, not for the first time, those who are, appeared to have a field day in dealing with their non-scientist colleagues. They complained about the regulations which restrict the freedom of scientists to do what they want, they introduced many red herrings, they emphasised the purported inadequacy of stem cells obtained from umbilical cord blood and from adult tissues, and supported the claims of the Scientific Establish ment that the creation of admixed animal-human embryos is essential, if a whole series of diseases are to be defeated. For example, my old friend, Dr Ian Gibson MP, having claimed to be "one who knows science backwards", 4 said that "adult cord cells… are effective in certain haemopoietic diseases… but they are unable to turn into other cell types". 5 Many other scientists would disagree with that statement. 6 Indeed, David Burrowes MP subsequently gave a very well-informed speech on the use of post-embryonic stem cells, 7 in which he pointed out that, while the Government wants us to be a world leader in stem cell research, we rank only 13th in the league table for collecting cord blood. This low ranking could well be because, as I have pointed out before, 2 the embryologists of the Scientific Establishment, who by their very nature want to work on embryos, tend to dominate the discussion (and, possibly, the grant-awarding processes) at the expense of other scientists, who, like their peers in other parts of the world, can see better ways forward.
Toward the end of the debate, Gordon Marsden MP returned to the need for a balancing act between legitimate ethical concerns and demands for the onward advancement of science and medical research. 8 I liked his wisdom in pointing out that it is not the job of the House of Commons "to canonise scientists, any more than it is our job to canonise cardinals", since there had been a clearly discernible tendency in the debate to put scientists, including scientist MPs, on some kind of pedestal. He also said that "I believe it is important that we give a clearer guideline to the HFEA on the law of the land under which it must operate. It worries me that, for example, the licences that were issued in respect of Liverpool and Newcastle [to produce admixed animal-human embryos] were then subject to press coverage about wonder cures".
The proposal to adopt Mr Leigh's amendment was defeated by 336 votes to 176, and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill should complete its passage through the House of Commons shortly after this Editorial has gone to press. The matter will not end there, of course, since the link between isolating stem cells from admixed embryos or human embryos and defeating serious diseases has not been established. I am as convinced as I can be that research on post-embryonic stem cells will prosper, and that the use of human embryonic stem cells of whatever origin will be shown to have been unnecessary. Whether or not an important ethical principle will have been irrevocably damaged along the way, is another question.
A few days after the House of Commons debate, some friends came round for dinner, and two of us ended up discussing the philosophies which underpin many human actions. When I checked my e-mails Editorial Experiments on Humans and Animals: Can the End Justify the Means? before going to bed, I found that my friend had already sent me a message, in which he said: "I just realised that the position I took amounted to The end justifies the means, but I think that is a little discredited".
When I used Google for a web search for The end justifies the means on 02.07.08, I had 3,530,000 hits, so, since this editorial was due to be submitted within a few hours, I decided that I would have to resort to making comments based on common sense, rather than indulging in even a superficial glance at all that the worldwide web had to offer.
I think my friend's reference to a "discredited" position may have been to consequentialism, which refers to "those moral theories which hold that the consequences of a particular action form the basis for any moral judgement about that action". However, another approach is deontological ethics, where "the rightness or wrongness of an act is derived from the character of the act itself, rather than the outcome of the action". A third approach is virtue ethics, which "focuses on the character of the agent, rather than on the nature or consequences of the action itself". 9 Let us consider an extreme example -the action of the Nazis in exterminating humans who had certain diseases. If three representative philosophers were consulted one by one and in isolation, the consequentialist might argue that eliminating the diseases justified the action, whereas the deontologist would say that the action was totally wrong, and virtue ethicist would probably say that this action told us a lot about the Nazis! In the real world, of course, we have to consider all the aspects of a particular circumstance together. We do this hundreds of times each day in our personal lives -we are continually making risk assessments, cost-benefit analyses, and deciding whether a particular end is justified by the means needed to achieve it.
The answer to the question, Can the end justify the means?, must always depend on the end, the means and the strength of the relationship between them, which may or may not justify a course of action. This is the basis of the requirement in the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 that, before granting a project licence for a programme of work, the Home Secretary must weigh the likely benefits (in terms of science, medicine and commerce) against the likely costs (to the animals that may have to suffer in one or more ways). There are some procedures (means) which the Home Office prohibits in British laboratories, however desirable the ends which might be served may be. This includes the use of great apes, for example. When I was a member of the Animal Procedures Committee, I tried to persuade the Home Office to publish (and regularly update) this list of prohibited procedures, but this suggestion was not acted upon.
Many decisions about whether a particular course of action should be carried out, permitted, avoided or banned, should be conditional and provisional, especially in relation to other events which may take place over time. That should be how the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 is administered, and the same should apply to what will shortly become the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2008. For example, in the House of Commons Committee debate, William Cash MP made the very sensible proposal that there should be a provision that embryonic cell research should be excluded when the viability of adult stem cell research became more firmly established. 10 Sadly, I doubt whether the Scientific Establishment would want that -Dr Gibson indicated that there are already other areas where admixed embryos could be used, such as studies of the effects of hormones and drugs on early development. 11 And how long will it be before the 14-day limit, beyond which admixed embryos must not be maintained, is seen as an unacceptable restriction on the freedom of scientists? I fear that we are already on the slippery slope… 
